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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University 
Institute was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 























































































































































































There is a tendency, especially among European scholars to 
identify regulation with the whole realm of legislation, 
governance and social control. This use of the term would make 
the study of regulation coextensive with law, economics, 
political science, sociology; indeed, with the entire body of 
social scientific knowledge. Within the framework of American 
public policy and administration, however, regulation has 
acquired a more specific meaning. It refers, to use Philip 
Selznick's formulation, to sustained and focused control 
exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a 
community (Selznick 1985:363-364).
Each term in this definition is important. The emphasis on 
valued activities excludes, for example, most of what goes on in 
the criminal justice system: the detection and punishment of 
illegal behavior is not regulation in the sense in which the term 
is used here. On the other hand, market activities can be 
"regulated" only in societies that consider such activities 
worthwhile in themselves and hence in need of protection as well 
as control. The reference to sustained and focused control by a 
public agency suggests that regulation is not achieved simply by 
passing a law, but requires detailed knowledge of, and intimate 
involvement with, the regulated activity. This requirement will 
necessitate, sooner or later, the creation of a specialized 
agency, or regulatory commission, entrusted with fact-finding, 
rule-making and enforcement.
Regulation, in the sense just specified, has always 




























































































European Community. Moreover, a greatly accelerated growth cf 
regulation is to be expected with the completion of the internal 
market. Yet, for reasons which are discussed below, the study of 
the organizational and politico-economic aspects of Community 
regulatory policy making has been sadly neglected. The aim of 
this paper is to introduce some of the basic considerations 
needed to analyze the problems and prospects of regulation in 
Europe.
1. From the interventionist state to the regulatory state
Why European scholars have traditionally devoted so little 
attention to the political economy of regulation is a question of 
more than academic interest. Because of this conceptual deficit 
we still lack theories capable of explaining the recent growth of 
regulatory policies at the national and, especially, at Community 
level. Our ability to offer advice about the choice of 
instruments and of appropriate institutional arrangements, is 
correspondingly weak.
A telling sign of the gap that exists today between theory 
and policy developments in this area is the way in which the 
issue of deregulation has suddenly emerged in public discourse, 
without any previous debate about regulation as a distinct type 
of policymaking. Hence the confusion about the meaning of 
deregulation in the European context and its relationship to 
other concepts likes privatization, de-legification and re­
regulation.
Historically, one can understand why European economists, 
political scientists, and legal scholars have not developed 
anything comparable to American theories of regulation in 
generality, analytic precision and empirical richness. 
Nationalization, to mention one significant historical factor, 




























































































American-style regulation in such key areas as transportation, 
telecommunications and public utilities.
Even when the same methods, such as entry and price 
regulation, standard setting or licensing, have been used, there 
has been a general reluctance to rely on specialized, single­
purpose commissions or administrative agencies. Instead, 
regulatory functions have been assigned to traditional ministries 
or to inter-ministerial committees. Important regulatory 
decisions are often taken at cabinet level.
By contrast, in the United States there is a long tradition - 
- which at the federal level goes back to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (1887) —  of regulatory commissions independent of the 
President and to some extent even of Congress. Even in the case 
of executive-branch (or "dependent") agencies such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA), or the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), it has been argued, for example by the "new 
Jeffersonians", that they effectively constitute separate 
branches of government outside of direct presidential control.
The preponderance of informal procedures for regulatory 
decision making in Europe —  compared with the procedural 
requirements laid down by the U.S. Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act for formal adjudication by regulatory bodies —  and 
the delegation of important regulatory functions to self- 
managing, semi-private bodies like the German 
Berufsqenossenschaften and various national institutes for 
technical standardization, are other factors that explain the low 
visibility of regulatory policymaking and the consequent lack of 
sustained scholarly attention.
However, the main difference between the American and the 
European approach to regulation has been ideological rather than 
institutional. The American rejection of nationalization as a 
politically and economically viable option expressed a widely 




























































































circumstances, and should be interfered with only in clearly 
circumscribed cases of "market failure": natural monopolies, 
market dominance, windfall profits, excessive competition, 
negative externalities, inadequate or asymmetrically distributed 
information (Breyer 1982).
In this view, regulation is primarily a tool to correct the 
defects of the market and increase allocative efficiency; 
distributive aims should be pursued by other means. As numerous 
recent studies have shown, the market-failure rationale is 
insufficient to explain the actual development of public 
regulation in the United States. Indeed, how can one explain in 
efficiency terms the regulation of basically competitive 
industries like airlines, trucking, agriculture, financial 
services, and long-distance telephone services? Still, the very 
success of the deregulation movement in a number of areas shows 
how important the ideology of economic efficiency has been, and 
still is, as a normative basis of public regulation in America.
In Europe, popular acceptance of the market ideology is a 
much more recent phenomenon. As Charles Meier (1978:23-49) has 
argued in his study of American international economic policy 
after the second world war, Washington's successful effort in 
Europe, as in Japan, was to ensure the primacy of economics over 
politics, to de-ideologize issues of political economy into 
questions of output and efficiency.
Not surprisingly, the treaty establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community in 1951 rejected the option of 
nationalization or internationalization of the ownership of the 
means of production in coal, iron, and steel in favor of a common 
market in these products achieved by removing custom duties, 
quotas, and other obstacles to free trade. Similarly, the Treaty 
of Rome creating the European Economic Community calls for the 
institution of a system which will ensure that competition in the 
common market is not distorted. In other words, the integration 




























































































means of free and competitive trade. To police competition among 
producers and to ensure and sustain the free movement of goods, 
important regulatory powers were assigned to the Commission of 
the EEC.
At the ..ational level, the heydays of state interventionism 
in the 1950s and 1960s were followed, in the 1970s, by a shift to 
traditional conservative attitudes in economic and social policy. 
Important segments of public opinion, not only at the right end 
of the political spectrum, increasingly tended to view the state 
less as the solution than as one of the problems that impeded the 
adjustment of the European economies to far-reaching structural 
changes in the world economy. The twin notions of deregulation 
and "government failure" expressed the growing skepticism in the 
ability of the state to act as planner, entrepreneur, employer of 
last resort, and direct provider of services which, it was 
argued, the market or voluntary, not-for-profit organizations 
could roduce more efficiently. Instead of trying to do 
everything, and in the end doing noth-'ng well, the state should 
limit itself to providing essential services and public goods, 
including the rules of the economic game and the protection of 
non-commodity values. Thus, paradoxically, the debate on 
privatization and deregulation has in the end succeeded in 
focusing the attention of European public opinion on regulation 
and its problems. The nature of these problems may be clarified 
by considering, however briefly, the American experience.
2. The ideology of expertise and the delegation of powers
A firm commitment to the virtues of the market is an important, 
but not the only, justification for the regulatory approach. 
Faith in the power of expertise as ar. engine of social 
improvement —  technical expertise which neither legislators or 




























































































been another important source of legitimation for American 
regulatory agencies.
For writers of' the New Deal era like Merle Fainsod, 
regulatory commissions emerged and became instruments of 
governance for industry precisely because Congress and the courts 
proved unable to satisfy the "great functional imperative" of 
specialization. Regulatory agencies "commended themselves because 
they offered the possibility of achieving expertness in the 
treatment of special problems, relative freedom from the 
exigencies of party politics in their consideration, and 
expeditiousness in their disposition". (Fainsod 1940:313).
Among the important reasons for the establishment of 
regulatory commissions mentioned by Cushman (1941) is the greater 
ease in recruiting experts for an independent agency than for 
executive departments. James Landis, probably the most 
influential theoretician of regulation in this period, finds an 
even closer relationship: "The demand for expertness, for a 
continuity of concern, naturally leads to the creation of 
authorities limited in their sphere of action to the new tasks 
that government may conclude to undertake" (Landis 1966:23).
And conversely, in Say’s law fashion, the supply of 
regulation creates its own demand of expertise: "With the rise of 
regulation, the need for expertness became dominant; for the art 
of regulating an industry requires knowledge of details of its 
operation, ability to shift requirements as the condition of the 
industry may dictate, the pursuit of energetic measures upon the 
appearance of an emergency, and the power through enforcement to 
realize conclusions as to policy" (Landis 1966:25-26).
To be sure, the New Deal advocates of regulation knew that, 
as Fainsod put it, the expertness of the regulatory bureaucracy 
is not always above suspicion. Still, they insisted that issues 
of fact should be handled by experts, using whatever methods 
appear to be most appropriate. Judicial review of the evidence 




























































































to "the very virtue of specialized knowledge which constitutes 
one of the chief justifications for the establishment of 
commissions" (Fainsod 1940:3-4).
Thus the "great functional imperative" of specialization and 
expertise leads to a blurring of the distinctions stressed by the 
classical doctrine of the separation of powers. For example, with 
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, the U.S. Congress delegated 
its own power to regulate an important aspect of interstate 
commerce, namely interstate railroad traffic, to an agency 
designed especially for the purpose —  the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC). This was an important institutional innovation. 
As Landis would comment some fifty years later, the novelty with 
respect to traditional administration consisted not only in the 
precise definition of the scope of its powers —  a particular 
industry —  but especially in regard to the responsibility given 
the commission for the exercise of those powers. In the words of 
Landis, (1966:16) "In the grant to it of that full ambit of 
authority necessary for it in order to plan, to promote, and to 
police, it presents an assemblage of rights normally exercisable 
by government as whole".
Because of this broad delegation of executive, legislative, 
and judicial authority, American regulatory bodies have been 
accused of constituting a politically irresponsible "fourth 
branch of government" never envisaged by the framers of the 
federal constitution. In the case of the ICC, the original 
delegation of powers was accompanied by a fairly clear 
specification of standards regarding jurisdiction of the 
commission and regarding the behavior of the railroads deemed 
unlawful. The commission was given the power to be flexible, but 
it was constrained in its discretion by clear standards, as 
stated in the act and as understood in public policy (Lowi 
1979:96). The "capture theory" of regulation (Stigler 1975) 
predicts that regulatory agencies become captured by the very 




























































































captured by its railroad clientele, but only after it was given 
new and entirely different responsibilities, such as power over 
minimum rates in addition to power over maximum rates, by the 
Transportation Act of 1920.
It is probable that the danger of "capture" of regulatory 
agencies by regulated industries has been exaggerated by recent 
critics of regulation. For example, clear evidence of capture (as 
distinct from bargaining and other forms of political exchange) 
is lacking in the vast area of social regulation (Wilson 1980). 
However, the problem of political oversight and control over the 
regulatory process exists and is made especially serious by some 
characteristic features of the process itself. We shall come back 
to this question after we have analyzed the role of the 
Commission of the European Communities (EC) as a regulator or, if 
one prefers, as a "fourth branch" of the governments of the 
Member States.
3. The EC Commission as regulator
The vast literature on European integration and on policy making 
in the European Community contains very few studies of the 
political economy of regulation at the Community level. So far, 
the most significant contributions to the study of EC regulation 
have come from legal scholars who are naturally more concerned 
with procedural questions than with substantive policy
evaluations or general theoretical explanations. Given the 
importance of Community regulation in so many areas of economic 
and social life, from banking and technical standardization to 
environmental and consumer protection, this scarsity of
regulatory policy analyses is surprising and can only be 
explained by the absence of a suitable theoreticaT~frantSwoTRT~" 
Aside from competition policy and- messuTfs~hecessary for the 




























































































programmes are specifically mentioned in the Treaty of Home. The 
transport and energy policies which could have given rise to 
significant regulatory activities, have remained largely 
undeveloped. On the other hand, the agricultural, regional and 
social policies which, together with development aid, absorb 
about 80 per cent of the Community budget, are mostly 
distributive rather than regulatory in nature.
How, then, can one explain the continuous growth of Community 
regulation, even in the absence of explicit legal mandates? Take 
the case of environmental protection, an area not even mentioned 
by the Treaty of Rome. In the two decades from 1967 to 1987, when 
the Single European Act finally recogni2ed the authority of the 
Community to legislate in this area, almost 200 directives, 
regulations, and decisions were introduced by the Commission. 
Moreover, the rate of growth of environmental regulation appears 
to have been largely unaffected by the political vicissitudes, 
budgetary crises, and recurrent waves of Europessimism of the 
1970s and early 1980s. From the single directive on preventing 
risks by testing of 1969 (L68/19.3.69) we pass to 10 
directives/decisions in 1975, 13 in 1980, 20 in 1982, 23 in 1984, 
24 in 1985 and 17 in the six months immediately preceding passage 
of the Single European Act.
The case of environmental regulation is particularly 
striking, partly because of the political salience of 
environmental issues, but it is by no means unique. The volume 
and depth of Community regulation in the areas of consumer- 
product safety, medical drug testing, banking and financial 
services, and even telecommunications, to mention only some 
policy domains, is hardly less impressive. In fact, the hundreds 
of regulatory measures recently proposed by the Commission for 
the completion of the internal market by 1993 only represent an 
acceleration of a trend set in motion decades ago.
The continuous growth of supranational regulation is not 




























































































making. Even the model developed by two distinguished scholars in 
order to explain the development of a Community policy for the 
protection of the environment fails, by explicit admission of its 
authors, to "predict the patchy but substantial amount of process 
regulation in the EC" (Rehbinder and Stewart 1985:315). Product 
regulation, these authors imply, is easier to explain because it 
is directly related to the free movement of goods across the 
common market. But what can be said of the growing number of 
Community regulations aimed at protecting non-commodity values 
such as health, safety or environmental quality?
Traditional theories are not very helpful here. At most, they 
suggest that the serious implementation gap that exists in the 
European Community may make it easier for the Member States, and 
their representatives in the Council, to accept Commission 
proposals which they have no serious intention of applying. The 
main limitation of this argument is that it fails to 
differentiate between areas where policy development has been 
slow and uncertain (for example, transport, energy or research) 
and areas where significant policy development has taken place 
even in the absence of a clear legal basis.
Moreover, existing theories of Community policy making do not 
usually draw any clear distinction between regulatory and other 
types of policies. Instead, our approach emphasizes the special 
characteristics of regulatory policy making. Hence we shall try 
to explain the growth of EC regulation primarily in terms of 
those characteristics.
4. Explaining the growth of EC regulation
One essential characteristic is the limited influence of 
budgetary limitations on the activities of regulators. The size 
of non-regulatory, direct-expenditure programmes is constrained 




























































































government tax revenues. In contrast, the real costs of most 
regulatory programs are borne directly by the firms and 
individuals who have to comply with them. Compared with these 
costs, the resources needed to produce the regulations are rather 
trivial. As Christopher De Muth (1984:25) writes, "Budget and 
revenue figures are good summaries of what is happening in 
welfare, defense, or tax policy, and can be used to communicate 
efficiently with the general public over the fray of program-by­
program interest group contention... In the world of regulation, 
however, where the government commands but nearly all the rest 
takes place in the private economy, we generally lack good 
aggregate numbers to describe what is being "taxed" and "spent" 
in pursuit of public policies. Instead we have lists —  endless 
lists of projects the government would like others to undertake".
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this 
structural difference between regulatory policies and policies 
involving the direct expenditure of public funds. The distinction 
is particularly important for the analysis of Community policy 
making, since not only the economic, but also the political and 
administrative costs of enforcing EC regulations is borne by the 
Member States.
As already noted, the financial resources of the Community 
go, for the most part, to the Common Agricultural Policy and to a 
handful of redistributive programmes. The remaining resources are 
insufficient to support significant initiatives in areas like 
industrial policy, energy, research, or technological innovation. 
Given this constraint, the only way for the Commission to 
increase its role is to expand the scope of its regulatory 
activities. This is precisely what has happened, and what will 
probably continue to happen in the future, since any savings in 
agriculture will have to be devoted to fulfilling the promises 
made to the economically weaker Member States in exchange for 




























































































Thus any satisfactory explanation of the remarkable growth of 
Community regulation must take into account both the desire of 
the Commission to increase its influence —  a fairly 
uncontroversial behavioral assumption —  and the possibility of 
escaping budgetary constraints by resorting to regulatory policy 
making. But this is only part of the explanation. Another 
important element is the interest of multi-national, export- 
oriented industries in avoiding inconsistent and progressively 
more stringent regulations in various EC and non-EC countries. 
Community regulation can eliminate or at least reduce this risk.
A similar phenomenon can be observed in the United States, 
where certain industries, faced with the danger of a significant 
loss of markets through state and local legislation, have 
strongly supported federal regulation ("preemptive federalism"). 
For example, the American automobile industry had good reasons to 
prefer federal regulation of air pollution because of the threat 
posed by different and inconsistent air pollution standards and 
also because it feared "a kind of political domino effect, in 
which one state legislature after another would set more and more 
stringent emission standards without regard to the costs and 
technical difficulties involved... Federal legislation was 
preferable to state legislation —  particularly if federal 
standards were set based on technical presentations to an 
administrative agency rather than through symbolic appeals to 
cost - externalizing politicians" (Elliott et al. 1985:331).
Thus the car industry, which during the early 1950s had 
successfully opposed federal emission standards for motor 
vehicles, abruptly reversed its position in mid-1965: provided 
that the federal standards would be set by a regulatory agency, 
and provided that they would preempt any state standards more 
stringent than California's, the industry would support federal 
legislation.
Analogous reasons explain the preference for Community 




























































































industries. Consider, for example, the "Sixth Amendment" of 
Directive 67/548 on the classification, packaging, and labelling 
of dangerous substances. This amending Directive 79/831'(OJL 259, 
15.10.79) goes much further than the parent Directive of 1967 and 
the first five amendments by adding a new classification of 
chemical substances dangerous for the environment and, more 
importantly, a scheme of prior notification involving tests for 
potential hazards before a substance is marketed.
The Directive does not prevent Member States including more 
substances within the scope of national regulations than are 
required by the Directive itself. In fact, the British Health and 
Safety Commission proposed to go further than the Directive by 
bringing intermediate products within the scope of national 
regulation. This, however, was opposed by the chemical industry, 
represented by the Chemical Industries Association (CIA) which 
argued that national regulation should not impose greater burdens 
on British industry than the Directive placed on its competitors. 
The CIA view prevailed thus ensuring that in this as in many 
other cases. Community regulation would in fact set the maximum 
as well as the minimum standard for national regulation (Haigh 
1984).
Similarly, German negotiators pressed for a European-wide 
scheme that would also provide the framework for an acceptable 
regulatory programme at home. German firms, concerned about 
overzealous enforcement by national inspectors and afraid of an 
environmentally conscious public opinion at home, wanted a full 
and explicit statement of their obligations to be defined at the 
EC level. Moreover, with 50 per cent of Germany's chemical trade 
going to other EC countries, German businessmen and government 
officials wished to avoid the commercial obstacles that would 
arise from divergent national regulations (Brickman, Jasanoff, 
Ilsen 1985).
The European chemical industry had another reason for 




























































































without consulting their commercial partners, enacted the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA). The new regulation represented a 
serious threat for European exports to the lucrative American 
market. A European response to TSCA was clearly needed, and the 
Community was the logical forum for fashioning such a response. 
An EC-wide system of testing new chemical substances could serve 
as a model for negotiating standardized requirements covering the 
major chemical markets. In fact, the 1979 Directive has enabled 
the Community to speak with one voice in discussions with the 
United States and other OECD countries, and has strengthened the 
position of the European chemical industry in ensuring that the 
new American regulation does not create obstacles to its exports. 
There is little doubt that the ability of the Commission to enter 
into discussions with the USA has been greatly enhanced by the 
Directive, and it is unlikely that each European country on its 
own could do so effectively (Brickman, Jasanoff, Ilsen 1985:277).
We can see now why models in which the only political actors 
are the national governments cannot explain the growth of 
Community regulation. Thus the model of Rehbinder and Stewart 
(1985) predicts that process regulation would not occur in a 
system requiring unanimous consent of the Member States, because 
states with relatively low standards would find it against their 
interest to agree to higher standards. Such models overlook too 
many important factors such as the variety of industrial 
interests within one country; the advantages of "preemptive 
federalism" for multinational or export-oriented firms, both for 
avoiding inconsistent national regulations, and for shifting 
regulatory decision making to a less political, more technocratic 
arena; the role of public opinion which makes the adoption of 
"lowest common denominator" standards increasingly difficult; the 
importance of speaking with one voice in negotiating 
international regulatory issues; and last but not least the 





























































































Given this ability, how should one interpret the minimalist 
approach to regulation apparently adopted by the Commission in 
the 1985 White Paper "Completing the Internal Market"? We turn to 
this question in the next section.
5. The limits of EC-style deregulation
Before discussing the new strategy outlined in the White Paper, 
it is important to point out that the Commission, even as it 
strives to expand its regulatory activities, does not attempt to 
replace or to supervise national regulation. Such a goal would be 
politically infeasible at present, and would in any case require 
a large increase in specialist staff, including the creation of 
Community inspectorates.
Comparing national and Community rule making in a number of 
policy areas, one can see instead two different regulatory 
systems, with the second designed to coordinate and complement 
rather than replace or challenge the first (Vipod 1989). At the 
same time, one should keep in mind that Community regulation, 
when agreed by the Council, has primacy over national 
legislation. Hence, regardless of the intentions of the 
Commission, national regulators tend to lose power in an 
increasing number of areas.
Harmonization, rather than unification, of national 
regulations has been the main objective of the Community in its 
first 25 years. Harmonization is the adjustment of national rules 
to the requirements of a common market. Its characteristic 
instrument is the directive because this instrument only 
specifies the regulatory objectives to be achieved, leaving the 
choice of methods to the Member States.
Substantial progress has been made in the creation of 
harmonized rules on a Community-wide basis. However, by 1985 the 




























































































remained to be done was such that the goal of completing the 
internal market by 1993 could not be achieved by relying 
exclusively on the harmonization approach. In the words of the 
Commission (1985:18) "experience has shown that the alternative 
of relying on a strategy based totally on harmonization would be 
over-regulatory, would take a long time to implement, would be 
inflexible and could stifle innovation".
After this nod in the direction of the advocates of 
deregulation, the document lists the key elements of the new 
strategy: mutual recognition of national regulations and 
standards: legislative harmonization to be restricted by laying 
down essential health and safety requirements which will be 
obligatory on all Member States; gradual replacement of national 
product specifications by European standards issued by the Comit 
Europ en de la Normalisation (CEN) or by sectoral European 
organizations such as CENELEC in the electrical sector and CEPT 
in the telecommunications sector.
Theoretically, the "new" strategy simply expresses an old 
principle of federalism (the so-called subsidiarity principle) 
according to which the higher level of government should 
intervene only to provide public goods that lower levels cannot 
supply (Dehousse:1988). Practically, it is an attempt to reduce 
the burden on the Commission in harmonizing national rules. As 
such, it could be explained by the French saying "reculer pour 
mieux sauter": a tactical retreat meant to take advantage of the 
political appeal of deregulation, and to rally all available 
forces around the banner of 1992.
It cannot have escaped policy makers in Brussels that while 
the completion of the internal market calls for massive 
deregulation at the national level, this must followed by re­
regulation at Community level. But as a regulatory solution of 
the various kinds of market failure that can be expected to arise 




























































































too weak. For example, it cannot handle negative externalities 
that transcend national boundaries, nor can it solve the problems 
which have proved too difficult even for the traditional approach 
through harmonization, as in the case of pre-market testing of 
new medical drugs (see below). It is also difficult to see how 
the new approach can work when some Member States still lack a 
regulatory framework in important policy areas. Finally, the 
method of mutual recognition seems to be incompatible with the 
logic of an integrated European market, since this logic cannot 
allow the achievement of the single market to be brought into 
question by unilateral measures of Member States (Joerges, Falke 
u.a. 1988).
Re-regulation at Community level may actually require to move 
beyond the traditional approach. Consider the case of drug 
regulation. For more than two decades, the Commission has 
attempted to harmonize and unify national regulations for the 
approval of new medical drugs. The present system includes a set 
of harmonized criteria and procedures for testing new drugs, and 
the mutual recognition of toxicological and clinical trials, 
provided they are conducted according to EC rules.
In order to speed up the process of mutual recognition, a 
"multi-state drug application procedure" (MSAP) was introduced in 
1975. Under the MSAP, a company that has received a marketing 
authorization from the regulatory agency of a Member State may 
ask for mutual recognition of that approval by at least five 
other states. The agencies of the countries nominated by the 
company must approve or raise objections within 120 days. In the 
latter case, the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products 
(CPMP) —  a group created by Directive 75/318 and which includes 
experts from Member States and Commission representatives -- has 
to be notified. The CPMP must express its opinion within 60 days; 
within another 30 days it may be overruled by the national agency 




























































































This procedure has not proved to be very effective. Actual 
decision times are much longer than those prescribed by the 1975 
Directive, and national regulators do not appear to be strongly 
bound either by decisions of other regulatory bodies, or by the 
opinions of the CPMP (Kaufer 1988:13-15).
Because of these disappointing results, the MSA procedure has 
been revised by Directive 83/570 which became effective in 1985. 
Now only two other countries must be nominated in order to be 
able to apply for a multi-state approval. But even the new 
procedure has not succeeded in streamlining the approval process, 
since national regulators raise objections against each other 
almost routinely. Thus, the path to the mutual recognition of 
national drug approvals is a thorny one.
As a well-known expert points out (Kaufer 1988:16), the 
problem is that differences among national schools of medicine, 
different national attitudes in the evaluation of risks and 
benefits, and differently perceived needs for new drugs, lead to 
divergent interpretations of new-drug approvals despite the fact 
that they have been prepared according to a standardized European 
format. In the opinion of the same expert, the most likely 
outcome is that the EC Commission will feel compelled to push for 
a centralized European Drug Agency (the nucleus of which could be 
represented by the national experts of the CPMP) in place of the 
multi-state application procedure.
By 1985, the typical time to complete development of a new 
drug was about 14 years, and the present value of development 
costs was of the order of $ 100 million. Hence the savings that 
could be achieved by a well functioning European Drug Agency are 
sufficiently large to make the idea of centralized drug 
regulation very attractive.
Analogous proposals have been made by other analysts, for 
example in the area of product safety (Joerges, Falke u.a. 1988). 
Moreover, the Commission itself, in the latest (fourth) action 




























































































European environmental inspectorate, while a proposal for a 
European Environmental Agency is currently receiving a good deal 
of attention in Brussels. I conclude that, despite the minimalist 
language of the 1985 White Paper, all the signs point not in the 
direction of deregulation but of a significant increase in 
regulatory activities at the EC level.
5. Reforming regulatory policy making in the European Community
If it is true that the scope and complexity of Community 
regulation are growing pari passu with the completion of the 
internal market, one question remains to be discussed: are 
present procedures and institutions adequate to meet the 
challenge, or are substantial reforms needed?
Present methods of regulatory decision making suffer from a 
number of defects. Among the shortcomings identified by analysts 
in various policy areas are the absence of central coordination, 
leading to serious inconsistencies across and within regulatory 
programmes, lack of rational procedures for selecting priorities, 
and insufficient attention paid to the cost-effectiveness of 
individual rules. In short, the present regulatory process is 
inefficient, in the sense that the same quantity of resources 
used to meet regulatory objectives could be reallocated to 
produce a greater level of benefits.
The process also suffers from a lack of political oversight, 
not only by the European Parliament but also by the President of 
the Commission and by the Council. The lack of political guidance 
and control is bound to become increasingly serious, since the 
growing complexity of regulation will require greater reliance on 
standing committees of experts and perhaps the creation of 





























































































Political oversight should be exercised at three different 
levels: at the highest level, in order to evaluate the total 
impact of regulation; at an intermediate level, in order to set 
priorities among different regulatory programmes, both within and 
across Directorates (or future regulatory agencies); and at the 
lowest level, to evaluate and compare individual rules in terms 
of the benefits and costs they are expected to produce. As 
indicated above, regulatory oversight is largely missing even at 
the lowest level.
Students of the American regulatory process have argued that 
the root cause of both economic inefficiency and inadequate 
political oversight is the absence of a regulatory budget process 
(Litan and Nordhaus 1983; De Muth 1984; Mendeloff 1988). Because 
the size of regulatory programmes is not significantly 
constrained by congressional appropriations and by the level of 
tax revenues, as in the case of direct-expenditure programmes, 
the regulatory process misses four steps central to bringing any 
expenditure under control.
First, neither the Executive nor Congress systematically 
determine the overall level of regulatory activity in a given 
period. Second, no office in the executive branch or committee in 
Congress is responsible for systematically establishing 
regulatory priorities across government. Third, the Executive has 
not instituted any systematic process of submitting regulatory 
proposals to Congress. Finally, there is no central agency to 
audit regulatory programmes. In short, no mechanism exists for 
regulation that requires policy makers throughout the government 
to solve the two-level budget problem —  how much to spend during 
a given period and then how to allocate this total amount among 
alternative uses —  which is addressed by any government in its 
direct-expenditure activities (Litan and Nordhaus 1983:86-87).
Many defects of the American system have their counterpart in 
Community regulation. Actually, as already noted, budgetary 




























































































Community regulation is carried by the governments of the Member 
States. Also, the absence of a central political authority 
implies that regulatory issues are dealt with sector by sector, 
with little attempt to achieve overall policy coherence.
Even within the same sector, it would be difficult to 
maintain that regulatory priorities are set in a way that 
explicitly takes into consideration either the urgency of the 
problem, or the benefits or costs of different proposals. For 
example, the imbalance between water and air pollution control in 
Community environmental regulation can hardly be explained by 
differences in the seriousness of the relevant problems. The 
health and environmental effects of inadequate regulation of air 
pollution, as well as the impact of divergent national 
regulations on competition, are no less serious than in the case 
of water pollution.
Again, some product directives choose total harmonization, in 
which case national regulations are completely replaced by 
Community regulation, while others rely on optional 
harmonization, without any obvious connection with the perceived 
seriousness of the relevant environmental or health risks. The 
piecemeal procedure of the Commission in proposing new regulation 
has resulted in directives in areas where harmonization is a low 
priority, while neglecting other areas which need a considerable 
amount of harmonization (Rehbinder and Stewart 1985:322-323).
Now, it is true that many defects of regulatory policy making 
in the Community are due to political and institutional factors - 
- such as the complexity of joint decision making, disagreements 
of Member States concerning priorities, or the need of the 
Commission to respond to national initiatives —  which cannot be 
modified in the short or medium term.
However, some improvements should be possible even within 
present constraints. For example, coordination could be improved 
by setting up a "regulatory clearing house" located at the 




























































































(DGs) would be asked to submit annually draft regulatory 
programmes to the clearing house for review. When disagreements 
or serious inconsistencies arise, the President of the Commission 
or a "working committee on regulation" would be asked to 
intervene. By extending centralized control over the regulatory 
agenda of DGs responsible for closely related areas such as 
environment, occupational health and safety, consumer protection 
and food and drug regulation, this review process would help the 
Commission shape a consistent set of measures to submit to the 
Council and the Parliament.
The usefulness of the procedure as a tool of managerial 
control could be increased by coordinating the regulatory review 
with the normal budgetary review, thus linking the level of 
budgetary appropriations to the cost-effectiveness of different 
regulatory programmes. The knowledge that DGs would be competing 
against each other would lead them to propose their "best" 
regulations. At the same time, simultaneous consideration of all 
new regulations would permit to assess their joint impact on 
particular industries and the European economy as a whole.
In addition to new coordinating mechanisms like the 
regulatory clearing house, it would be useful to examine the 
potential for coordination of instruments that have not been 
designed for that purpose. An interesting example is the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) recently introduced into 
Community legislation. American experience under the National 
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) suggests that EIAs have 
considerable potential as a coordinating mechanism. The NEPA 
requires all federal agencies to analyze the environmental 
effects of proposed actions, and of reasonable alternatives to 
such actions. From the view point of coordination, perhaps the 
most significant part of the requirements is the review and 
comment process. Because of its obligations under the NEPA, the 
Environmental Protection Agency is the only federal agency to 




























































































and comment period serves as an opportunity for interagency 
coordination since it assures active participation by all 
agencies involved.
Introducing a similar procedure into the Community policy 
making process would not only improve coordination, but also 
serve to implement the requirement of the Single European Act 
that environmental considerations shall become part of all the 
other policies of the Community. In order to institutionalize 
this internal review process, the Directorate General for the 
Environment should be given the possibility of commenting on 
programme proposals made by other DGs. The coordinating potential 
of the review procedure would be greatly enhanced if EIAs were 
not limited to individual projects, as in the present EC 
directive, but could be extended to cover groups of related 
programmes ("joint environmental impact assessments").
Another important direction of regulatory reform —  the 
creation of specialized agencies and inspectorates —  has already 
been mentioned. A detailed discussion of such matters would 
exceed the scope of this paper. However, it is important to point 
out that these recent proposals represent not so much radical 
innovations as a development of institutions already present in 
nuce in Community policy making. Thus, a European Drug Agency 
would presumably develop out of the Committee for Proprietary 
Medicinal Products. Other permanent committees of experts could 
undergo a similar evolution. One can even detect the nucleus of a 
future environmental inspectorate in the group of national 
representatives who meet regularly with the Commission to review 
the working of the 1979 Directive on testing, notification and 
classification of new chemicals (Haigh 1984).
Any proposal for reforming Community policy making is bound 
to raise serious doubts about its implementability. It is quite 
possible that the number of politically feasible solutions is 
much smaller than the range of alternatives suggested by policy 




























































































allowed to obscure the fact that in the perspective of a fully 
integrated European market and the consequent growth in volume 
and complexity of Community regulation, the question of 
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